The discussion on state institutionalization and
growth in sub-Saharan Africa seems to be framed as to enable an understanding
of complex political and societal crises through means of moral condemnation of
Africa’s patrimonialism, and the related encouraged practices such as nepotism,
patronage, and corruption among others. These practices are narrated as it they
were unique to Africa. Patrimonialism is framed as the source of democratic and
economic failure, neglecting other key factors.
This simplistic narrative of the situation in sub-Saharan
Africa is promoting an image of strong men versus weak states causing the poor
performances of the states. The main point is that the state in sub-Saharan Africa
was never properly institutionalized after the hurried departure of colonial
powers because the political sphere was never emancipated from the societal
one. As a consequence, African states are weak and will never conform to the
Western idea of political modernity. A question must be raised: what is the
Western notion of modernized state? According to Weber, a modern impersonal and
institutionalized state draws a clear line between the private and the public
sector, and establishes an independent bureaucracy. Sub-Saharan Africa is
described as failing to commit to these principles. The continent has been
accused countless times of patrimonialism, an obstacle to the emergence of the
modern state. It seems that the African population has resigned to its
fatalistic future: they know that the political sphere will commit power abuses
all over again, and do not attempt to stop it.
I believe that such an analysis fails to address that
this happens in Western societies as well. Other blatant cases of nepotism can
be found outside of sub-Saharan Africa as well. For example, the United States
has one of the most prominent nepotistic political structures in the world (see
President Donald Trump appointing his family members for positions in the White
House), and examples of controversial appointments can be found in Europe as
well (see former French prime minister François Fillon appointing his wife as
his parliamentary assistant). Despite the next to zero effort that was made to
guarantee the smooth transition from colonial submission to independence in sub-Saharan
Africa, the suggested three analytical interpretations of state formation still
consider patrimonialism and nepotism as intrinsic characteristics of the
African population. Colonial political models failed either because only the
external façade corresponded to the Western ideas, while the internal parts
crumbled under dysfunctionality and informal networks, or because the
indigenous African realities were contextually different from the Western
counterparts, or, lastly, because of the imported political structure was
modified by the African cultural traditions.
In contrast to this narrative, several studies have
suggested to reconsider the application of Weber’s concept of modern state to sub-Saharan
African case studies, as it appears to have been misunderstood and that
successful stories of African states can also be linked to patrimonial
realities. It largely depends on the infrastructure behind the political power
and the nature of the leadership. Sometimes it works, like in Botswana with
neopatrimonialism (a fusion of impersonal democratic institutions with a
distinction between the private and public sphere, and the inevitable
patrimonial attitude), in other cases it does not, like in the Central African
Republic. The word patrimonialism is not, indeed, a synonym for failure and it does
not always have destructive implications. In fact, the rulers can be held
accountable by the ruled, and it is important to understand the factors behind
the legitimation of the power as its impact on state growth and development differs
from leader to leader, and from context to context. In my opinion, the discourse
on the institutionalization of sub-Saharan African states is framed in a
paternalistic and simplistic way. For example, it attributes the most probable
cause of state failure in post-colonial Africa to cultural incompatibilities,
as the political structures imported from the West ended up being completely
different from the original ones. The involvement of economic, political, cultural
and social parameters is easily pressed under the label of bad governance
causing a failed process of state institutionalization and lack of access to
state institutions based on merit and competence.
This is not to say that there are not problems of
patronage, clientelism or nepotism in sub-Saharan African realities. Although
not unique to the continent, they are persistent characteristics of it. Understanding
their role in African politics is crucial in order to devise adequate solutions,
as they are impeding the states’ institutionalization. A vast part of African
politics is based on personal loyalty to political leaders, who then use coercive
measures to legitimize their power and manage networks of protected clients. However,
the problem is not only political, and this situation should not be labelled as
a Leviathan one, in which states are naturally oriented towards bad practices, but
instead as a remnant of European colonialism. The notions of progress and
success are invariably associated with Western countries, so scholars need to
cast aside misconceptions and misleading narratives to better analyse the
essence of sub-Saharan African states without falling into the trap of
considering Africa an exception. Instead, comparative studies of different
regions should be taken into consideration.
It would be interesting to challenge the argument of
Chabal and Daloz in “Africa works:
disorder as political instrument”, in which they describe patrimonialism as
an intrinsic feature of the African population, by investigating whether
different political and administrative structures can work in the sub-Saharan African
contexts as models of “good governance” and “best practices” in alternative to
the current patrimonial apparatuses.
No comments:
Post a Comment