Terrorism_Reading Memo

From the readings, a number of important points have been raised. Whether a State is facing an insurgency group or a terrorist organisation, the government has to keep in mind that a military only solution isn’t the sole response to the crises. Terrorist/insurgency groups feed on violence to pursue their goals and the current securitisation of this threat feeds the flame of violence. It has been observed that States with a weak institutional legitimacy and governance are more exposed to this very same violence.

If we have a look at the case of the Kenyan response to Al-Shabaab in ‘Killing a mosquito with a hammer’: Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya, it seems already easy to understand the path the authors will follow just by reading the title itself. “Killing the mosquito with a hammer” is probably the best way to illustrate the current trend which relies mainly on “punishing” a community instead of dealing with the threat itself. This example, although used here for the Kenyan situation, can also be put in parallel with other examples in the region.

The Somali and Muslim communities in Kenya not only have been targeted by Al-Shabaab for many years, but by the Kenyan Government itself which has carried out operations against the terrorist organisations whilst undermining the rights and freedom of the two latter communities.

Kidnappings, extra-judicial killings, “communitisation” of people, ineffective counter-terrorism operations, abuse of power … not only have failed to protect the local population, but has stigmatised some communities and most importantly, possibly have rendered the terrorist organisation itself more legitimate and powerful.

Indeed, Al-Shabaab, criminal organisations and other jihadist terrorist organisations and the violence they use poses a significant threat to peace, security and stability in a number of States in which these groups operate including neighbouring countries (due mainly to porous borders) in the Sub-Saharan African region.

Kenya for instance had a security response which was deemed inappropriate by the authors of the article since this response itself was only short-term in a sense and also had repercussion on the local population (which in return leads to the production of conditions which would benefit the insurgency).

The targeting of Kenyan-Somali Muslims by the government is just one example of this problem illustrated in the title with the idea of punishing a whole community for the crimes of one group. Such policy will be problematic when it comes to peace building operations in the future.

The sense of marginalisation, of injustice and of fear has proven to become a fertile asset for insurgency groups and terrorist organisations.

In ‘The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political worldview, we observe once more that the Nigerian response to this threat was once again through security campaigns which led to further abuse against civilians and communities.

Just like in the first case above with Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram can find a source of legitimacy in its fight against the Government by using the very same speech of victimhood, which can be explained by the overreaction of some States when dealing with this matter, and therefore gaining more local support and exploiting safe havens.

There can be many reasons behind an insurgency or terrorist activity from religious to territorial, political, social etc. However, we can observe that all these groups have a political objective. Therefore, the response to these threats can’t simply only by a military solution. There is a need for political dialogue if we want to reach a long term solution.

Many recommendations can be drawn out from the readings and they include:

-        The need for Political dialogue with the groups involved and the need to reach out to Muslim communities or “target” communities to better understand the fragmentation. Reaching out and understanding the problem will give more legitimacy to the Government and leader of the State. This should be done at a local level to gain the support of the population.

-        It is also vital to have a military presence (whilst avoiding abuse such as rapes, killings, kidnappings…) as a presence on the ground will create a sense of security among the local population and may also disrupt illegal and terrorist activities in the area. A strong and firm presence is needed.

-        Accountability for crimes committed by both parties is vital as this is truly the real source of long term stability and trust building between the government and the parties/communities involved. Fair trials should be organised and the respect and enhancement of human rights should be promoted in this instance.

-        An important element is the inclusion of the “target” population in political and military positions. Such process will better integrate the target population in the functioning and ruling of the country itself.

-        Economic investment in the region at stake. It has been pointed out numerous times that Groups will operate and target a poorer region which is seen as marginalised due to the lack of infrastructure, of government presence & action and the lack of resources (sometimes). This feeling of injustice and marginalisation (just as in Northern Mali for example) is prone to the establishment of insurgency/terrorist organisations that bring a message of hope to the local population.

-        Continued military operations. Military operations can be successful to some extent when borders are controlled (porous borders will be counter beneficial in military operations). Terrorist have to be drawn out of their hiding spots without necessarily being drawn out of the country as this will result in further security issues. Military operations are needed but whilst avoiding civilian casualties at all cost.

There are many approaches I could have chosen from to write this short reading memo. I however wanted to focus on the response of government to the current threats. The recommendations listed above are only few which seem appropriate in these situations but more are obviously needed.

The importance here for a Government is to differentiate an insurgency group from a terrorist group. Both groups may resort to similar actions and tactics in order to reach their goal. It is however important to point out that frequently, the outcome is political which is why a political solution is needed on top of a military solution. Furthermore, these organisations are evolving and are becoming more sophisticated which is why strong leadership and firm political will is needed. It however seems that today, many countries which face these threats lack in leadership and in legitimacy which is not only the potential cause for insurgency and terrorism, but also the cause for lack of progress when facing such groups.