Terrorism_Reading Memo

From this week’s readings, an interesting topic that emerged was the diverse ways in
which people are mobilized into different African terrorist groups. First, marginalization is a
common theme in the recruitment of fighters for the LRA, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. In both
the cases of the LRA and Boko Haram, sub-national cleavages between northern and southern
Uganda and Nigeria serve as great sources of tension. While in some cases grievances may have
been originally propagated by former colonial rule, it can also be used in contemporary conflicts
to recruit fighters by projecting the “other side” as a pertinent threat in need of a response.
Furthermore, this tension can be exacerbated by the rotation of power between northern
and southern elites. While I originally thought that the rotation of power between different
groups is something that would inherently promote equality in representation, it is clear that its
effects actually creates further social tensions. This is because as power moves between north to
south, different groups are marginalized at different times with each rotation. Furthermore, when
this rotation is made formal and is then not respected, such as in the case of President Goodluck
Jonathan’s re-election in Nigeria, violence can break out and further political inequality. As
pointed out in the reading, marginalized groups are more likely to engage in civil war over other
forms of violence because they lack alternative avenues of accessing power. So, as different
groups are continuously marginalized in this cycle, it seems tensions will only continue to rise
and feed into this aspect of mobilization. In the case of Al-Shabaab in Kenya, the group’s
recruitment tactics largely cater to the historically unequal treatment of the Somali population by
the Kenyan government. Furthermore, as the government brands Al-Shabaab’s radicalism as a
foreign rather than a homegrown issue within marginalized Somalis, they misses the intricacies
the group’s of domestic mobilization efforts.

Along with the commonality of marginalization, another significant component of
recruitment seems to lie in responses of the government, media, and civilians. As clearly shown
in the case of the Ugandan state, the Nigerian state, and Nigeria's neighboring states,
governmental responses to insurgency often come in the form of harsh security campaigns.
These can be heavily armed and marred with civilian abuses and casualties, as governments may
fail to distinguish between civilians and militants. Furthermore, as governments have greater
access to a wider arsenal of weaponry than do terrorist groups, they can easily do more damage
than those they wish to suppress. I agree that this fuels the grievance and victimhood that
underpins mobilization, and ultimately exacerbates the issue at hand.

Additionally, in covering terrorism over other stories, the media may project certain
terrorist groups as more powerful than they truly are. Because there is “drama in challenging the
state” that will attract viewership, it can be argued that terrorist groups receive a disproportionate
amount of media coverage to other deadly issues, such as automobile accidents and the spread of
disease. From this, prospective fighters may attracted to these groups under false pretence, and
the assumption with this argument is that this pretence is therefore avoidable. While this
argument brings up valid issues, such as that of over and underrepresentation, I don’t see how the
media could cover such issues without running into this problem. Furthermore, whether
something is more or less deserving of attention can often be whittled down to opinion, though
increasing viewership surely plays a key role in the selection of news stories.
In the response of civilians, too, there can also be great and unintended backlash. Because
of civilian insecurity, which is in part derived from dangerous state responses and in part by
civilian-targeted terrorism, some communities have formed local militias for their protection.
This, to me, seems like a very natural response if the state shows that it cannot protect its
citizens, and especially if the state is also an evoker of violence. In the case of Boko Haram, the
reaction to local militias caused an increased frequency in the violence against civilians. This, in
turn, hurts more civilians, which will receive even more media coverage, and will inevitably
continue the cycle of terrorist recruitment. Again, as the state cannot protect its people, it’s hard
to see an alternative way for civilians to protect themselves without aligning with the terrorist
group itself, or with the state violence.