Terrorism_Reading Memo

The authors argue that the strategies used by Boko Haram are in many ways similar to what we saw with the Lord’s Resistance Army. In this sense, Boko Haram is not a group of irrational madmen as the media portray them, but rather a rational actor with clear goals and the means to achieve them.

The first similarity between Boko Haram and the LRA noted by the authors is their base of operation and the demographics surrounding them. High poverty and low development are common features in both regions where Boko Haram and the LRA operate. The division of North-South in Nigeria and the regionalization in Uganda can be dangerous. It leads to marginalization of ethnic groups in a country. This allows certain armed groups to mobilize the population and use ‘inequality’ and ‘alienation’ as a rhetoric to win the people’s hearts. Furthermore, both groups initially started with the goal of securing the population’s trust. Over time, this rhetoric degraded into violence against their own population. Violence against civilians heightened in both cases. There is also a similarity in how states and international actors respond against the LRA and Boko Haram. Force is the primary tool. In the end, the authors concluded that military-centric strategy used by Nigeria and Uganda will result in civilian insecurity in the short and medium run. These strategies employed by the states seem to work, but at the cost of civilian lives.

My thoughts and questions: Both Boko Haram and the LRA are violent groups willing to employ brutal methods to achieve their goals. The authors point out a trade-off between persecuting terrorists and oppressing civilians. Aside from these criticisms, however, no alternative method was proposed. What can be the alternative? Should states increase their counter-terrorism effort and pursue a harsher campaign against terrorists, and accept the cost of civilian lives as collateral damage?

‘Killing a mosquito with a hammer’: Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya

This article deals with networked, transnational violent armed groups such as Al-Shahaab and its attacks beyond the Somali border. Al-Shahaab launched a series of terror attacks against Kenyan population, resulting in over 800 casualties between 2011 and 2015. The Kenyan authorities responded to these attacks via various means. The first was an increase in policing the Muslim population. These methods include screening, curfews, requesting IDs, and deporting illegal immigrants. The second involve extra-judicial killings. Kenya’s security forces have been accused of assassinating Muslims suspected of supporting or being terrorists. Human Rights Watch reported 34 cases of disappearance. This led to a widening gap between security forces and the Muslim communities in the country. Third, Kenya blame its own insecurity to its refugee population. The Dadaab camp, for example, is seen as a breeding ground for Al-Shahaab recruits. Kenya had the population’s support when it announced the plan to close the camp. Refugees in the camp were expatriated. Fourth, security laws have amended.

Jihad in Sub-Saharan Africa

This article begins by telling us that jihad has been portrayed by the media as the ultimate threat to Africa’s security, despite the fact that more people are killed every year by malaria or traffic accident. This is understandable as jihad makes for a better story than malaria. This article argues that there is nothing exceptional about the rise of Boko Haram, and other jihadist groups in the Sub-Saharan region. Quite the contrary, rebelling in the name of Quran is a theme that has been repeated again and again. Various jihadist groups have been operating in what is now Somalia since the 16^th Century, and the 17^th Century in West Africa. For European colonizers, Islam was a useful tool to maintain stability and order in the countries. They preferred to deal with Arabic scholars rather than tribal leaders. In their eyes, Islam was easier to deal with than illiterate barbarians. On the other hand, Islam was seen as a force that resisted Christianization of Africa.

My thoughts: This reading is titled “Challenging the Narratives of the War on Terror”. I see very little challenging being offered, but rather a meandering writing about Islam’s history in Africa. How does that even challenge the narrative of President Bush when he announced his War on Terror? He also mentions that the situation today is not about mass conversion, but rather to spread Islam further into the public sphere. Wouldn’t these two things correlate, anyway?

‘The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political worldview

Thurston brings up 4 points that are often raised when discussing the rise of Boko Haram, and those are poverty, political marginalization, al-Qaeda extension, and Boko Haram being the second upcoming of the Maintatsine Sect. The author believes that these 4 factors are inadequate in explaining Boko Haram, and that we must look further the interaction between structure, politics and ideas in NE Nigeria and see how these locality factors reflect on the broader trends in armed violence.

Boko Haram considers themselves the true preachers of Islam. They reject other views. Western schooling system is rejected, because it fails to incorporate Islamic features. Democracy is also seen as an undermining factor to Islam. For example, Boko Haram’s scholars preach that democracy places people on the same level as God. Freedom of beliefs allow for apostasy. True Muslims, therefore, must oppose it. The common rhetoric Boko Haram uses to win support is that the Muslim community in Nigeria is constantly being marginalized and oppressed by the government. They portray themselves as victims. The majority of Boko Haram’s targets were Muslim themselves. Not only does Boko Haram troubles Nigeria, it also poses a threat to its neighbors. These include Cameroon and Chad.

Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s alliance was due to both ideological and practical reasons. Differences between these 2 terrorist organizations remain. Boko Haram has managed to antagonize the entire Muslim population in the region. It pursues a brutal strategy against civilians on an even higher scale than what the Islamic State has done.

In the end, the author proposes recommendations for the Nigerian authority. The country should engage in more dialogues with the Muslim population in the North to reach an understanding. The government of Nigeria should combat Boko Haram’s propaganda which states that the government is willing to harm its own Muslim citizens. The government should also address the human rights issues conducted by Boko Haram. And lastly, more offers of negotiation must be extended towards members of Boko Haram.

My thoughts and questions: The recommendations of the author seem rather optimistic, specifically the last option. Boko Haram is undoubtedly an extremely violent group capable of committing atrocities surpassing ISIS itself. What kind of negotiation can the Nigerian government expect from this? Why should gestures of mercy be offered to these individuals? Could the Nigerians afford the luxury of generosity towards this dangerous enemy?