State in Africa_Reflection Memo

In the last class on African Security we discussed „modern“ state in African countries.  Two interesting questions were raised. Firstly, it was a question on the origin of neo-patrimonialism and its perception by the African populations. Secondly, we had a little discussion on the hybrid state perspective analogy based on chapter 1 of Chabal's book.

            Let me start with the former, on the origins of neo-patrimonialism in African states and its perception. The origin of patrimonialism is inseparable from Weber's theory on domination which is, respectively, tied to the personalization of the state in Africa and hierarchical, centralized structures. Those factors create an invisible and unwritten mechanism of exchange between power holders and other actors within the society in (re)distributing public resources. To put it simply, the chief (the head of state, the President) controls the resources which he considers as his own property, his patrimony. Of course, to exercise his domination over other people he cannot be alone. Since the patriarchal agents (based on family ties) are too fragile and insufficient, he uses the patrimonial technique: redistributing the resources among chosen individuals in exchange for their fidelity and loyalty. The reciprocity and hierarchy establishes a cliental system where the public goods are no longer distinguished from the private goods. It is a type of political domination along interest rather than blood relations.

            Both the personalization and centralization of political power have their origins in colonial administration which in different ways denaturalized traditional authorities by replacing them by their own foreign administrators. The French colonizers implemented their centralized and hierarchical administration structure on their colonies which were directly dependent on the “métropole” – France. The British preferred the so called indirect rule which was supposed to involve more local customs and traditions. However, in both cases the colonial administrators in site had one main task: maintain order at lowest possible costs. They were given limited resources and combined with their geographical distance and slow communication possibilities with “home” the administrators became the most powerful people in the community since they possessed and distributed resources. Their personality became part of the domination.

But why do we talk about neo-patrimonialism? The term defines the combination of two logics: the patrimonial political domination relying on clientelism within a formal state framework. This framework was officially institutionalized during the independence era, including new constitution promoting centralization with a President as head of state, officials etc. and embedded the legal rational structures where every function becomes a potential source of patrimonial logic. Still, this type of political domination is not a state in the legal rational sense.

This point leads to the second issue raised in class: the hybrid state perspective which according to the book chapter focuses “on the effects of the mixing of the Western norms introduced under the colonial rule and the values inherent to African social systems.” It is described as a rather positive case stressing the successful adaptation of the Western state model. However, based on the reactions of some of my classmates I would say that the perception of the “hybrid state” was rather negative underlining the failed implementation of the Western state model in many African countries. According to their opinion the “modern” state failed to integrate indigenous cultural, ethnical, linguistical, traditional values and perspectives. Besides, the notion of “nation” was mentioned as an identity basis defining most of the European “modern” states, and which differs significantly from the situation in Africa where we cannot speak about nations yet. After explaining me all those negative aspects of the “modern” state implementation in Africa we came to the question – how to deal with them? Anybody could give an answer to that. Indeed, it is an extremely difficult question. Nevertheless, I think that there are some approaches, which probably won't be able to give a full answer, but still could at least discover possible directions. First of all, when talking about Africa and the state we should stop depicting it so negatively. An example from class: Neo-patrimonialism could be seen also from a more positive perspective than a kind of corrupt system. It could be seen as a simply different system of political domination. The fact that something is different doesn't mean it is worse. Secondly, we also should try to avoid the direct comparisons with European nation- and state-building even though they are tied to the state-building in African countries. It is important to change the perspective and observe rather than judge. This goes back to the part in the Chabal's chapter where he says that the partial success of state in Africa enables comparisons with European states. One cannot and should not compare them. Divergences such as the timing, neo-patrimonial relations, absence of a real political opposition, and the foundation of African political parties on ethnicity rather than social groups, etc. show that the states may implemented similar frameworks but based on different ideas and perceptions.

I know that those are ideas for a theoretical discussion but still, I believe that even being aware of the way we talk about things can change them in fact. At least it can change the way people perceive them. In my opinion, nowadays it is impossible to remove or reject the “modern” state in Africa because it is already (although in many countries only partially) part of the African countries. Still, what can be changed from the external side (meaning the West) is “liberating” the view on clientelism and different forms of “modern” state emerging from different circumstances, and its future development. I don't think that the legal rational state is not at all suitable to African countries because despite its imperfections it still offers a framework for sharing different opinions, for protection and for a functioning of a society. The question here is not how to change the state in Africa but how to adapt it to particular experiences of countries, regions or groups of people. I think that in the not far future we'll witness decentralization, federalization, changes in borders, and the emergence of new, smaller states. All of that resulting from initiatives from the bottom, from the people. And for once Western states should just observe the changes on the African continent.

State in Africa_Reflection Memo

The topic of the class was the nature of african state. We focused mainly on patrimonialism and clientelist networks which is a key component of states in Africa.

There has been raised a question how are these clientelist networks set up. From what I understood from the discussion from the class there are two main factors influencing the setting up of clientelist networks.

The first one is the nature of institutions where the huge role is played by centralization of power as well as the personalization of that power. Thus one group or one person is distributing resources to lower lever in order to sustain his or their support. However this process has to be reciprocal, meaning that both clients and patrons have to benefit from this relationship. The relationship itself also very often relies on the local factor or the element of kinship or ethnicity. For example in Somalia is the clientelist network based on clan factor.

The second key factor for this set up is the constelation of power or in other words relationship between politicians and traditional authorities in african states. This factor was illustrated by the example of postindependent Kenya or Ghana where after the gaining of independence there took place an elite cooptation which was the main moving factor for the power set up. However in these states there were enough recources in the center to be distributed and after that distribution the crises came along which resulted in the centralization of power. A different example was given – the Democratic republic of Congo where Mobutu didn´t coopt elites but used coercion.

Other question relating clientelist networks has been raised – how the public of these african states percieves these networks. This is of course very subjective and can´t be generalized. The percieving of clientelist networks by public hugely depends on each state and conditions the state is in. For example if the state is successful in providing schools, health care or infrastructure, the public views this set up as good and the other way round. One important remark regarding this has been noted and that is that the ability to posess recources depends on the access to institutions – the state in Africa is a crucial instrument. There is as well another important factor in the public stances in general and that is the education – uneducated persons don´t know what the institution actually is and therefore don´t know what is right.

In the class we also discussed the nature of the state and in that context mostly the hybrid state. It was noted that some african states try to apply the western model of a state which in combination with traditional precolonial structures creates usually weak and non-functioning states. They are trying to reach the balance between the modern and traditional state which leads to pressure which then can lead to breakdown. For example some of the traditional institutions can be preserved in these states however they can´t work as they used to in the precolonial period.

The main concluding point of that class´discussion was that context matters. Each and every african state is different and nothing can be really generalized. For example every state has a different degree of patrimonalism or centralization. And the process of creating these states is a dynamic process wich might go in different directions.

State in Africa_Reflection Memo

In discussing Patrimonialism and clientelism in the context of the nature the African state, one significant observation has to do with the fact that, the indigenous political institutions in Africa thrived on the relationship between the patron and the client, in that, the former exacted loyalty from the later on the basis of the formers monopoly over resources and his ability to distribute same within that indigenous political establishment. But it is important to state that such arrangements were localised and limited to the scope of influence of the particular ruler in pre-colonial times. Such rulers were sovereign in their own right and thus were not responsible and accountable to any higher authority.  What colonialism succeeded in doing was to make the position of the local ruler dependent on the colonial establishment through a series of colonial Ordinances which eventually eroded the sovereign nature of the indigenous political authorities. Thus, whether or not a local ruler continued in his or her position was dependent on how that ruler was viewed by the colonial authority as being loyal or not. Given the peculiar nature of the evolution of the African state, such arrangements turned the local ruler into a client with a new patron being the colonial authority. However, to the indigenous people, the local ruler maintained his influence as a patron. Colonialism therefore transformed the practice and elevated it to the level of the colonial state.

Again, given the fact that at independence, the nascent African state had all the external trappings of a modern western state and yet lacked the norms and values which underpinned the western liberal democratic state, African political elites determined that the only logical and plausible way of building a modern nation-state, was to tap into that structural resource which had ensured the success of the colonial enterprise-Patrimonialism. 

A second observation has to do with the fact that the existing international political order within which African states emerged did not only reinforce patrimonialism and clientelism but perpetuated it. The bi-polar nature of the world and the raging cold war meant that newly emergent African states had to align with either of the super powers in order to gain prominence and become relevant in the international system. Regime survival was equally dependent on ones degree of alignment.     The super-powers themselves also propped up regimes to the extent that a particular regime could provide the necessary ingredients required for the absolute loyalty of the state.

For example Mobutu Sese Sekou of Zaire now DR Congo, had his brutal and dictatorial regime supported by America and the West for over three decades because the territory possesses all the mineral resources which the West needed and Mobutu could ensure that resources were distributed in a manner which ensured the loyalty of the political elites to him whilst he transmitted that loyalty to the global power. Another example in Africa was the Regime of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

This is not to absolve African leaders of any blame since there were other alternatives which they could have explored.         

State in Africa_Reading Memo

The discussion on state institutionalization and growth in sub-Saharan Africa seems to be framed as to enable an understanding of complex political and societal crises through means of moral condemnation of Africa’s patrimonialism, and the related encouraged practices such as nepotism, patronage, and corruption among others. These practices are narrated as it they were unique to Africa. Patrimonialism is framed as the source of democratic and economic failure, neglecting other key factors.

This simplistic narrative of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa is promoting an image of strong men versus weak states causing the poor performances of the states. The main point is that the state in sub-Saharan Africa was never properly institutionalized after the hurried departure of colonial powers because the political sphere was never emancipated from the societal one. As a consequence, African states are weak and will never conform to the Western idea of political modernity. A question must be raised: what is the Western notion of modernized state? According to Weber, a modern impersonal and institutionalized state draws a clear line between the private and the public sector, and establishes an independent bureaucracy. Sub-Saharan Africa is described as failing to commit to these principles. The continent has been accused countless times of patrimonialism, an obstacle to the emergence of the modern state. It seems that the African population has resigned to its fatalistic future: they know that the political sphere will commit power abuses all over again, and do not attempt to stop it.

I believe that such an analysis fails to address that this happens in Western societies as well. Other blatant cases of nepotism can be found outside of sub-Saharan Africa as well. For example, the United States has one of the most prominent nepotistic political structures in the world (see President Donald Trump appointing his family members for positions in the White House), and examples of controversial appointments can be found in Europe as well (see former French prime minister François Fillon appointing his wife as his parliamentary assistant). Despite the next to zero effort that was made to guarantee the smooth transition from colonial submission to independence in sub-Saharan Africa, the suggested three analytical interpretations of state formation still consider patrimonialism and nepotism as intrinsic characteristics of the African population. Colonial political models failed either because only the external façade corresponded to the Western ideas, while the internal parts crumbled under dysfunctionality and informal networks, or because the indigenous African realities were contextually different from the Western counterparts, or, lastly, because of the imported political structure was modified by the African cultural traditions.

In contrast to this narrative, several studies have suggested to reconsider the application of Weber’s concept of modern state to sub-Saharan African case studies, as it appears to have been misunderstood and that successful stories of African states can also be linked to patrimonial realities. It largely depends on the infrastructure behind the political power and the nature of the leadership. Sometimes it works, like in Botswana with neopatrimonialism (a fusion of impersonal democratic institutions with a distinction between the private and public sphere, and the inevitable patrimonial attitude), in other cases it does not, like in the Central African Republic. The word patrimonialism is not, indeed, a synonym for failure and it does not always have destructive implications. In fact, the rulers can be held accountable by the ruled, and it is important to understand the factors behind the legitimation of the power as its impact on state growth and development differs from leader to leader, and from context to context. In my opinion, the discourse on the institutionalization of sub-Saharan African states is framed in a paternalistic and simplistic way. For example, it attributes the most probable cause of state failure in post-colonial Africa to cultural incompatibilities, as the political structures imported from the West ended up being completely different from the original ones. The involvement of economic, political, cultural and social parameters is easily pressed under the label of bad governance causing a failed process of state institutionalization and lack of access to state institutions based on merit and competence.

This is not to say that there are not problems of patronage, clientelism or nepotism in sub-Saharan African realities. Although not unique to the continent, they are persistent characteristics of it. Understanding their role in African politics is crucial in order to devise adequate solutions, as they are impeding the states’ institutionalization. A vast part of African politics is based on personal loyalty to political leaders, who then use coercive measures to legitimize their power and manage networks of protected clients. However, the problem is not only political, and this situation should not be labelled as a Leviathan one, in which states are naturally oriented towards bad practices, but instead as a remnant of European colonialism. The notions of progress and success are invariably associated with Western countries, so scholars need to cast aside misconceptions and misleading narratives to better analyse the essence of sub-Saharan African states without falling into the trap of considering Africa an exception. Instead, comparative studies of different regions should be taken into consideration.

It would be interesting to challenge the argument of Chabal and Daloz in “Africa works: disorder as political instrument”, in which they describe patrimonialism as an intrinsic feature of the African population, by investigating whether different political and administrative structures can work in the sub-Saharan African contexts as models of “good governance” and “best practices” in alternative to the current patrimonial apparatuses. 

State in Africa_Reading Memo

This week readings explain us the behaviour of African states. It shows us the clientelist networks, state brutality and offer some explanations of the situation in contemporary Africa. As the readings for last week, these articles also show us how our understanding of Africa is desperately low and that we have to change that if we want to bring some positive changes to the continent.

Chabal and Daloz present few theories why the state in Africa has more informal and personal character. They explain the clientelist character when leader provides goods to his clients and assign people to offices because of their loyalty and not qualification for the job. We often hear about the colonialism as main reason for non-functioning African state. This reading was very interesting for me because it shows the other side – that the influence of colonialism is overestimated, and that there cannot be much of a conflict between the “modern state” and traditional aspects of the community because the “modern state” as we see it in west was never fully implemented and even colonial power used personal relations and informal rule etc. According to them, today´s situation is similar to the pre-colonial one. It makes me realize that I have never heard much about the pre-colonial systems and relations in Africa. This article also makes me wonder if patrimonial relations are really that natural in Africa. Are they more welcomed than the western-type state? What do Africans think about these two options? Or do they favour some third option even more? Is western-type state that unnatural for Africa? How should ideal African state look like? Also, I am curious how does this work, how can you become client of a leader – is it based on some common roots or you can just pay to someone to protect you and give you some resources?

In the other chapter of their book (chapter 6) they speak about different types of violence – criminal and political, and also about for example warlords, privatization of war and the illegal activity in Africa. They explain that the patrimonial system is not seen as criminal but as legal, because it does not lead (unlike criminal activity) to the advantage for just the perpetrator but he will redistribute the resources. It brings me back to my question – how people in Africa see the patrons? And is it different in each country? I recall that there was said in their book that the patrimonial state is seen as normal even in democratic countries. The violence also seems to be “normal” in Africa and there is no clear solution. Should the West change their approaches and help or is it better if they stay out of Africa completely? Will this increase the chances of development of functioning state and decrease of violence?

Richards also talk in his chapter about the patrimonial state. He deals with some of its problems – for example when there is a lack of resources and the patrimonial state thus lacks legitimacy. He describes some history phases in Sierra Leone. He writes that diamonds are important part of that system but are mostly used by rebels etc. to sponsor their fighting and there are not enough resources to be distributed which can bring some problems. How important role diamonds actually played in that conflict? And is the best solution in this situation to renew the patrimonial state (which was on hold) or should there be different solution and different system?

Finnström talks in his chapter about the situation in Uganda which is interesting and useful additional information to the last weeks readings and knowledge.  It was interesting for me to find out that USA designed LRA as terrorist group and ruled out negotiations, making Uganda another part of war on global terrorism. From the last week I have got the impression that US went to Uganda because of domestic pressure and that the military option was favoured mostly by Ugandan government. Can LRA be considered terrorist group? In the articles it was mostly described as rebel group. Of course, they commit some horrific violence and brutality and there is no universal definition of terrorism. But last week, it was said in the readings that LRA does not have to seem to have any goal (anymore), only want to keep the power. If that is true it is not a political goal, which is often part of most of the definitions of terrorism, and cannot thus be seen as terrorist group. Also how can US rule out negotiations when local people believed that peaceful solution is more appropriate and, unlike military options, will not increase the violence. Why we keep ignoring local people? Do we really want to help Africa or are we still using it only to achieve our, Western, goals? The article also says that the local government feel obligated to do what their international donors want them to do and not listening to local population, which once again shows that Africa seems to be (even though it probably cannot be made the generalization and would be too simplified) about our desires and not the needs of local population. This article shows us also the violence committed by the government who, as we were said last week in the narratives, are the “good guys.” It shows us that nothing is that simple and makes me wonder even more why we keep these beliefs even though, as this readings clearly show, we have the knowledge. I am not sure if we can say we have lack of knowledge about Africa, as these articles shows we have knowledge but it seems we are ignoring it.

The last article, written by Morten Bøås, explains the situation in Democratic republic of Kongo and in Somalia. It is very interesting to know that even though those two states are considered to be failed it does not mean the complete absence of state. It is very weak and not functioning properly but that does not mean they are completely absent and there can even be some stable parts. It is again our Western standard that is judging it. I never realized that these places are not just pure anarchy, is not something you will hear if you do not read scientific articles about Africa (and even then this information is sometimes missing). One of the most important passages of this article was the one explaining the characteristics of the relations within the state – the clan and religious importance in Somalia and the problematic citizenship laws in Democratic republic Congo. How is this created in other countries? Are they mostly clan based, religion based or do they connect to each other through common citizenship? Or completely different thing? Is it influenced by history or also other aspects?

     These readings were, again, very interesting. I like that they are connected to the ones last week so they can increase our knowledge, even though they are raising many more new questions for me. I do now have huge knowledge about Africa and that is why these articles shows many areas I would like to know more about. Mostly the patrimonial state and how is it seen by local people, if it is seen as the best solution or just the lesser evil? And, also the role of western world, can we do something to help by changing our approach (as many articles suggest that we should) or would we help Africa the most if we simply disappear? How can the ideal state in Africa be created and  based on historical and cultural aspects, how would the ideal state in Africa even look like?